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Abstract

This essay’s starting point is scholarship describing the state practice of using law as a tool of mass atrocity, and
the part played by liberal trials in obscuring this ‘dark side’ of legality. It asks whether law’s complicity with
atrocity is only visible when one steps outside the legal arena, or whether there might be opportunities within
liberal legal institutions to develop what the essay calls self-reflexive law: rule of law mechanisms that expose
the part played by law in violence. To explore this question, the essay offers a close reading of a lawsuit in
which the key part played by law in atrocity was made explicit at trial: a class action filed in 1986 under the
Alien Tort Statute on behalf of 10,000 Philippine victims of torture and other gross abuses against Ferdinand
Marcos. Studying the representations of violence produced by the various participants in the litigation, the
essay attempts to elicit some of the legal and political conditions favorable to a self-reflexive law. The essay
offers a distinct version of ‘minor jurisprudence,’ recovering ‘minor’ practices within orthodox law itself,
namely oral trial proceedings, and attempting to derive insights from the minor in order to contribute to legal
design.
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Toward a Self-Reflexive Law?
Narrating Torture’s Legality in
Human Rights Litigation
Natalie R. Davidson*
In Law after Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence of the Holocaust, David
Fraser argues that criminal trials held in the post-war era in North
America, England and Australia constructed a memory of the Nazi
crimes that obscured the ‘legality of the Holocaust’ (2005: 216). He
challenges the view, most famously advanced by American prosecutors
at Nuremberg, of the Third Reich as a regime of brute force to which
law is the corrective, by arguing that there is no radical discontinuity
between law as practiced and understood by German jurists between
1933 and 1945 and legal practice and reasoning in democracies. Fraser
has been accused of adopting a reductive understanding of law as mere
technique (Mertens 2007: 542-3), and in my view draws from the
continuities between Nazi law and democratic law the unwarranted
conclusion that there is no meaningful distinction between the two.
Nevertheless, his book should be welcome for emphasizing law’s
potentiality as a tool of physical atrocity, and the part played by trials
in obscuring this ‘dark side’1 of legality.
We are by now familiar with challenges to the law/violence
dichotomy. Robert Cover famously observed that law facilitates the
exercise of state violence, through the provision of justifications and
the division of labor among actors (Cover 1986). Yet whereas Cover
accepts this state of affairs as a necessary ‘disciplin[ing] ‘ of violence
100
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(1628), Fraser claims that legal discourse can be key to even the most
extreme and arbitrary forms of violence. Moreover, given that trials
are important contributors to collective memory (Savelsberg and King
2011: 24), Fraser’s demonstration of the ways trials have obscured the
legality of Nazi violence suggests that the public does not recognise
the part play by law in heinous violence. As a result, law can continue
to contribute to extreme violence unhindered. Thus, Fraser exposes
the complicity with violence of two distinct layers of legality: the law
of repressive states, and trials of mass atrocity.

That responses to mass atrocity should better acknowledge law’s
contribution to violence is all the more pressing in light of authoritarian
regimes’ reliance on courts (Mayoral Diaz-Asenzio 2012), and the
growing and paradoxical obsession with legal form accompanying
widespread violence in the neo-liberal era (Comaroff and Comaroff
2006b). If trials of atrocity, intensely publicized and reported upon,
do not acknowledge the legality of much violence, we – lawyers and
members of the public, including potential perpetrators – might fail
to recognise mass atrocity when it is before us, cloaked with legal
rationality and familiarity. Yet the principal legal mechanisms used to
address mass atrocity, namely domestic and international criminal trials
as well as truth commissions, do not appear to expose the legality of
violence any better than the post-war criminal trials described by Fraser.
These mechanisms are accused of concealing the bureaucratic, banal
character of state-sponsored and organised repression (Leebaw 2011).

To clarify the issue, we can follow Jothie Rajah in distinguishing
between the ‘rule of law’ (law substantively infused with liberal
principles and constraining arbitrary power) and the ‘rule by law’ (law
in which there are no effective constraints on power) (Rajah 2012: 50;
see Nonet and Selznick 2009 for a comparable distinction between
‘autonomous law’ and ‘repressive law’). It seems that when rule of law
mechanisms address mass violence, they are incapable of exposing the
rule by law. In this way, rule of law mechanisms unwittingly shield the
rule by law from scrutiny and challenge. But need this be the case?
My concern lies not in the normative quandary of whether the
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unjust laws of authoritarian regimes should be considered legitimate
and applied (Hart 1958; Fuller 1958). Rather, I consider as an empirical
matter the state practice of using law as a tool of mass atrocity. Is this
practice only visible when one steps outside the legal arena, or might
there be opportunities within liberal legal institutions to develop what
I will call self-reflexive law – mass atrocity trials that could expose the
part played by law in violence?
To explore this question, I turn to a lawsuit in which the key part
played by law in atrocity was made explicit: a class action filed in a
Hawaii federal court on behalf of 10,000 Philippine victims of torture
and other gross abuses against Ferdinand Marcos, one month after his
ouster from power in 1986. The lawsuit was filed under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), a statute interpreted between 1980 and 2013 as granting
U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits by foreign victims of gross
human rights abuses even if committed outside the United States.

The legal treatment of torture is a particularly fertile area in which
to explore the possibility of self-reflexive law. Torture, as traditionally
conceptualised by international lawyers, is an official act linked to
the exercise of public power. If its prohibition is ‘emblematic of our
determination to break the connection between law and brutality’
(Waldron 2005: 1739), international law must impliedly recognise the
existence of that connection. Yet in practice, even among international
lawyers, ‘[t]orture is more often understood to have arisen from
primal or political impulses emerging in spite of law, than from the
manipulation of legal language.’ (Johns 2012: 34).
This paradox is on view in Marcos, where the legality of torture was
made very clear at trial in the thick descriptions of repression provided
by witnesses, while the courts, in their principled written decisions,
exhibited great difficulty confronting law’s contribution to violence.
This essay offers a close reading of the case inspired by scholarship on
law’s representation of history (Douglas 2001), in an attempt to elicit
some of the legal and political conditions under which a mass atrocity
trial could expose, where relevant, the legality of extreme violence.
This essay does not seek to explain the conditions favoring the
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rule by law, though I suggest that trials of atrocity that obscure this
phenomenon enable its recurrence. It focuses on the secondary layer
of legality discussed by Fraser: atrocity trials. With respect to that
layer, it does not propose a general model of law, such as the model
of ‘responsive law’ furthering substantive justice advocated by Nonet
and Selznick (2009). Instead, it draws attention to one by-product of
atrocity trials, historical narratives about violence. My argument is not
that judges or lawyers should consciously aim to expose the legality
of violence or teach history, as this could undermine defendant rights.
Rather, given the important part played by atrocity trials in the social
construction of violence, I submit that when choosing among and
designing legal responses to mass atrocity, we should give weight to
those features that are favorable to rich historical accounts exposing
the legality of violence.

The term ‘self-reflexive law’ is not meant to fully equate ATS
litigation with martial law, or more generally the rule of law with
the rule by law. It highlights however the commonalities between
these forms of law, in particular the formalism which provides
legal institutions an appearance of rationality and legitimacy. These
commonalities suggest difficulties in exposing legal foundations of
violence through legal proceedings. Through the Marcos case, this essay
seeks to identify those difficulties and possibilities of overcoming them.
My understanding of law as imbricated in violence and as
contributing to the social construction of reality owes much to Critical
Legal Studies (CLS). This essay departs from CLS not because of its
attempt to harness the law in progressive ways, as much critical human
rights scholarship has redemptive elements (Golder 2014). What
distinguishes the present analysis from CLS is the methodology of
critique and reconstruction: the analysis of the historical narratives
produced in litigation. Critical scholars have historicized the law
in order to recover alternative paths, but those efforts have typically
focused on the doctrinal history of ‘mandarin’ texts (Gordon 1984: 120).
This essay gives oral trial proceedings center stage not only because
they are likely to make a significant contribution to lay constructions
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of violence (with journalists more likely to report on them than to read
appellate court decisions), but also because they are a rawer, richer
source of narratives about violence.

Drawing on CLS but analysing historical narratives, the present
analysis offers a distinct version of ‘minor historical jurisprudence’,
in the sense of a critical historical analysis (Tomlins 2015). Similarly
to the line of minor jurisprudence associated with Peter Goodrich,
this essay attempts to recover practices ‘denied or ignored’, ‘repressed
or absorbed’ (Goodrich 1996: 3) in order to disrupt assumptions
prevalent in mainstream legal scholarship. However, while scholars
engaged in minor jurisprudence have turned to practices far removed
from orthodox modes of law-making, such as literary texts, this essay
suggests recovering ‘minor’ practices within orthodox law itself,
namely oral trial proceedings. While trial proceedings are of course
conventional sources of sociolegal history, neither they nor the historical
narratives contained in them are conventional sources of normative legal
analysis. This turn to the minor within the major reflects a less radical
relation to the major than that offered by most authors in this collection.
While their work is primarily disruptive and antifoundational, this
essay attempts to derive insights from the minor in order to contribute
to legal design.
Part I provides background on the lawsuit. Part II shows that at trial
the contribution of legal form and discourse to repression was made
very clear for doctrinal and evidentiary reasons. Part III argues that
these insights were lost in the court decisions disseminated throughout
the legal community. The conclusion reflects on the possibilities of
developing a self-reflexive law.
1. From Martial Law to the Alien Tort Statute
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, before
the end of his second term as elected president of the Philippines.
Until February 1986, when he was deposed by a popular movement, he
ruled in an authoritarian manner. Known as an exceptionally brilliant
lawyer, Marcos endeavored to provide legal legitimacy to his regime,
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seeking constitutional amendments and Supreme Court approvals
of his concentrations of power. The regime’s attachment to law has
been explained as a technique of rationalisation masking arbitrariness,
along with a technocratic discourse of socio-economic development
(Thompson 1995: 4). Both were partly geared toward international
support: the technocratic discourse impressed international lenders,
while the attachment to legal and democratic form pleased the United
States, which provided Marcos unfailing economic, political and
military support throughout most of his rule (Muego 1988: 129-30).

Following the assassination in 1983 of opposition leader Benigno
Aquino, Ronald Reagan’s administration urged Marcos to hold free
elections to promote economic stability and restore political legitimacy
(id 141). In February 1986, Marcos was announced winner of the
elections against Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, but the polls had
been clearly rigged. Aquino launched a successful civil disobedience
campaign backed by the Catholic Church and a rebel group of officers.
After receiving assurances that Aquino was a moderate, on the 3rd day
of the ‘People Power Revolution,’ Reagan asked Marcos to resign,
arranging for his flight to Hawaii (id 160-1).

A number of human rights groups had helped to expose the
hypocrisy of Marcos’ formally legal ‘democracy’. In 1986, Philadelphia
attorney Robert Swift contacted these groups, which subsequently
convinced victims to file claims. Few believed that the plaintiffs would
win the case, but they hoped that the filing of the lawsuit could serve
to document the extent of repression under Marcos. Thus, one month
after Marcos and his entourage fled to Hawaii, five lawsuits, including
one class action led by Swift, were filed against him in federal courts
in California and Hawaii pursuant to the ATS, alleging torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killing. Marcos died in 1989 while
the litigation was pending, and was replaced thereafter by his estate,
represented by his widow and son.

The five cases, including the class action relating to ‘all civilian
citizens of the Philippines, who, between 1972 and 1986, were
tortured, summarily executed or ‘disappeared ‘ by Philippine military
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or paramilitary groups’ (Order Granting Class Certification) were
consolidated for trial in a federal court in the District of Hawaii. In
1992, Marcos’ liability was determined by a six-member jury after two
weeks of trial. While forty-four victims testified in person, the case
rested largely on circumstantial evidence. Proving liability towards the
class members who were not named plaintiffs required establishing a
pattern of human rights violations that would indicate that thousands
of similar violations had likely occurred (Fitzpatrick 1993). This
evidence was provided through the testimony of eight expert witnesses,
comprising members of international and Philippine human rights
organisations, Philippine academics, and U.S. State Department
officials, and legal documents, including legislation and decrees issued
by Marcos, arrest orders and certificates of release.
On September 22, 1992, the jury found the defendant liable for
torture, summary execution and disappearance (In re Estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460, hereinafter ‘910
F. Supp.’: 1463-4). On February 23, 1994, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
$1.2 billion in exemplary damages (Trial Transcript, hereinafter ‘TT ’,
22 February 1994: 111-2). The third and compensatory damages phase
of the litigation ended with an award of close to $800,000 to 9,541
claimants (Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos 1996).

Human rights lawyers have applauded the Marcos litigation for
breaking new legal ground. Elsewhere, I analyse how the plaintiffs’
attempts to enforce their damage award have conf licted with
transitional justice policy in the Philippines (Davidson 2017b). I have
also argued that the participants in the Marcos litigation produced
narratives that legitimated the neo-colonial relationship between the
United States and the Philippines (Davidson 2017a).. In what follows
I show that the case succeeded to some extent in exposing the legality
of violence, and offer my interpretation of the conditions that enabled
and constrained law’s self-reflexivity.
2. Self-Reflexity at Trial
At trial, law enabled the plaintiffs to connect Marcos to the acts of
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individual torturers and to prove a pattern of abuses that would apply
to the entire class, in addition to being a form of documentary – and
therefore ‘objective’ – evidence. However, the trial’s success in revealing
law’s dark side was limited as plaintiffs presented martial law as
resulting from the Philippines’ failure to properly follow the U.S. legal
model.
A. Law as Facilitator of Abuses

The plaintiffs presented the human rights violations as having been
perpetrated by ‘a dictator’ (TT 9 September 1992: 17), in a ‘systematic
and repetitive’ (id 13-14) manner. This notion of systematic state
action derived from the definitions of torture, summary execution and
disappearance under international law, which require official action,
combined with the nature of class actions. Given that the defendant was
at the top of a hierarchy of perpetrators, it would have been impossible to
connect him to most victims without establishing a policy of repression.

In the narrative put forward by the plaintiffs at trial, law played a
key role in realizing the state’s policy of repression, and also provided
concrete evidence of wrongdoing. The legal theory of liability was that
of ‘command responsibility,’ a doctrine developed by the international
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, whereby defendants are
held responsible for the actions of their subordinates. To establish
Marcos’ personal liability, the jury was instructed that even if he had
not directly ordered torture, summary execution and disappearance, his
knowledge of these violations and failure to take effective measures to
prevent them was a sufficient basis for liability (Final Jury Instructions:
10). In relation to most victims, liability rested on failing to prevent
abuses. To show that he had knowledge of the abuses, the plaintiffs
tried to prove that he knew of the pattern of violations or even specific
violations. This was done by showing that ‘Marcos received daily
intelligence briefings and Marcos was informed of the fruits of the
torture of high profile dissidents’ (TT 9 September 1992: 18), and that
international human rights organisations and the U.S. government had
approached Marcos and his circle to discuss the violations. In order
to convince the jury that Marcos had the power to prevent the abuses,
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the plaintiffs insisted that Marcos ‘was a micro manager, a hands-on
person.’ (ibid).

The plaintiffs’ theory of a tightly managed policy of repression
probably concentrates excessive blame on Marcos, erasing the
responsibility of his collaborators. However, this theory had the
advantage of attributing to law a crucial facilitative role. First, the
plaintiffs explained that Marcos’ constitutional maneuvers allowed
him to concentrate power. In fact, as shall be explained shortly,
constitutional law provided the overarching framework to understand
the case. Second, the plaintiffs showed how legal formalism served to
mask arbitrariness.
After the opening statements, during which Swift explained that
‘martial law created the opportunity for Ferdinand Marcos to commit
human rights abuses’ and described Marcos’ extensive powers to order
arrests and detention (id 17), the first expert witness called by the
plaintiffs was constitutional law professor Father Joaquin Bernas, who
testified ‘about the structure and practical legal effect of Philippine
constitutional law and proclamations, decrees, general orders and letter
of instruction enacted by Ferdinand E. Marcos between 1972 through
1986’ (TT 10 September 1992: 10), Bernas opined that:
‘between September 21, 1972 and February 25, 1986, by virtue of the
constitution which Mr. Marcos had declared ratified, and by virtue
of his proclamations, decrees and other enactments, he exercised
complete control over both the executive and legislative branches of
government. He also significantly weakened the judicial system by
transferring much of its jurisdiction to the military tribunals under his
control. Moreover, the atmosphere he created seriously undermined
the independence of the Supreme Court and other courts. He alone
could appoint justices and judges.’ id 11).

In order to explain his opinion, Bernas described in detail Marcos’
maneuvers to revise the constitution, ensuring his continued tenure
and the expansion of his powers. He explained the coherent and
hierarchical legal structure of repression, from the constitution down
through the declaration of martial law, General Orders 2 and 2-A
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that authorised the arrest by the military of listed individuals, to
the individual arrest orders signed by Marcos. The jury was asked to
become familiar with the regime’s bureaucratic jargon, hearing detailed
expositions of the differences between three types of arrest order: the
ASSO, PCO and PDA. Bernas explained how Marcos removed the
judiciary’s independence through formal legality – by requiring all
judges outside the Supreme Court ‘to submit their letter of resignation
for acceptance or rejection by the President, so the President would hold
it as long as he wanted to, or act on it whenever it was opportune for
him to act on it’ (id 43). Legal events – the declaration of martial law
in September 1972, a cosmetic lifting of martial law in January 1981,
and the ‘notorious Amendment 6, which gave [Marcos] full legislative
powers parallel and superior to that of the national assembly’ (id 18-19)
– were presented as the milestones of repression. During his testimony,
twelve laws, orders, decrees and letter of instruction signed by Marcos
were introduced as exhibits. In other words, legal texts were offered as
evidence of wrongdoing.
By recounting one of the jokes common in Philippine political
culture, Bernas also conveyed the gap between the legal formality
of the constitutional system and the arbitrariness of Marcos’ powers:
In Proclamation 1081, in which Marcos declared martial law, he
stated that, and I quote, ‘all persons presently detained, as well as
all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed
in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the
law of the nations, crime against public order, crimes involving the
usurpation of authority, rank, title and the improper use of names,
uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and
for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I shall
subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of
any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me
personally, or promulgated upon my direction, shall be kept under
detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly
designated representative’. Whereas, the current joke had it, ‘until
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It was important for the plaintiffs to show that law provided a cover
for arbitrariness in order to explain the context of the human rights
violations, as well as to counter the line of defense. The overall defense
can be reconstructed as follows: Martial law was declared in accordance
with the constitution, and was necessary given instability in the country;
Marcos did not personally order or know about the abuses, for which
responsibility lies fully with the military; and the human rights abuses
were not as numerous as claimed by the plaintiffs (id 45). To support
these points, defense counsel argued that victims of abuse had legal
recourses in the Philippines (TT 9 September 1992: 45-7). Throughout
the trial they made reference to the holding of elections and the formal
legality of Marcos’ rule as well as to the complaints procedures put in
place by the regime to address claims of abuse by the military.
Other experts on behalf of the plaintiffs echoed Bernas’ view of law
as having facilitated repression under Marcos, and this in order to link
Marcos to the human rights violations committed by his subordinates.
Describing Decree 1850 that gave military courts exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving human rights violations committed by Philippine
security forced, expert witness Prof. Dianne Orentlicher insisted
that ‘[t]his decree exemplifies a general characteristic of Ferdinand
Marcos’s leadership, one that is critical to understanding his personal
responsibility for the violations that I’ve described. Marcos created a
legal framework that enabled abuses to occur and enabled them to occur
based on the predilections of one man.’ (TT 18 September 1992:126).

This constitutional framework or ‘legal atmosphere’ having been
established by the experts, the individual victim testimonies and
exhibits added evidence about law’s repressive uses under Marcos. For
each victim testifying, an arrest or temporary release order was put in
evidence to prove the arrest had taken place. Many victims were asked
if they recalled when martial law was declared – that legal event being
the defining moment of the dictatorship. Through their testimonies,
law even appears as a pervasive presence in the everyday experience
of repression. In the more than forty testimonies of victims, a pattern
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of suppression of dissent emerges: potential critics of the regime were
arrested with an arrest order, ‘broken’ through torture and months –
sometimes years – of detention in ‘rehabilitation centers,’ and released
with a Temporary Release Order, which often required them to report
regularly to the military or police. While on temporary release, it was
close to impossible for them to find employment, as they lacked security
clearance. Following years of good behavior, they would sometimes
be granted a final release order and finally be left alone by the security
services. In this way, torture and the terror created by the salvaging
and disappearance of other dissidents were only the initial stages of a
long-term bureaucratic system of suppression of dissent.
The testimony of Adora Faye de Vera, a student activist for the
women and the poor who was arrested, tortured and raped during nine
months, after which she was turned into an agent for the government,
provides a vivid account of the formal use of law by the regime in its
relations with its victims. She described how upon becoming an agent,
she was made to sign a number of absurd-sounding documents:
‘In March 1977, I signed an agent’s agreement, I signed a purchase
of information agreement, I signed a sworn statement saying I was
arrested alone, that I didn’t know where Flora and Rolando [the friends
arrested with her and later killed] were, and admitting that I was a
subversive, and I also signed a waiver saying that I wasn’t tortured
and that everything I was signing was not under duress.’ (TT 14
September 1992: 41).

Expert witness Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, also testified that ‘[t]orture victims were
regularly forced to sign statements that they had not been badly treated.’
(TT 15 September 1992: 26-7). These documents cannot be viewed
simply as tools for the regime to cover its traces, counter-evidence
to be provided to human rights monitors, courts or governmental
commissions in the event of accusations of abuses, though that is
undoubtedly part of the story. Some of these documents, such as the
‘agent’s agreement’ and ‘purchase of information agreement’ were
unlikely to ever be shown to a third party. Moreover, one witness
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testified to having signed, upon release from detention and torture, a
‘pledge of allegiance where we need not to, you know, be interviewed,
to talk with anybody.’ (TT 18 September 1992: 42). One can surmise
that the regime believed such documents would have some persuasive
force in silencing victims, and possibly making repression appear more
legitimate to the security forces and low-level torturers and bureaucrats
themselves. If that was the case, then law was not only used to centralise
power and legitimate the regime vis-à-vis foreign donors and the
Philippine public, but also to control victims and perpetrators.
B. Martial Law as Degenerate Law

Regrettably, these insights about the dark sides of law were
understood to be limited to non-Western law. Indeed, in order to
explain the intricacies of Philippine constitutional law to a jury of
ordinary Americans, the plaintiff lawyers and expert witnesses drew
comparisons with the U.S. constitution. The result was a representation
of martial law as a distortion or degenerate form of U.S. law. Typical
of such a comparison was the opening speech of plaintiff counsel
Randall Scarlett:
‘Just as President Reagan only had two terms here, under their constitution,
we will learn, that President Marcos could only do two terms there.
That term was to end in 1973. What he did instead was a systematic
or system wide change to the entire government that allowed him to
remain in power for 13 years beyond 1973 and become a consummate
dictator of the Republic of the Philippines.’ (TT 9 September 1992:
40, emphasis added)

Bernas explained that before Marcos revised the constitution,
‘[t]he 1935, Philippine Constitution closely resembled the American
Constitution as to the structure of government. It provided for three
branches of government, executive, legislative and judicial, and for
an elected president. The president was given a term of 4 years with a
maximum of two terms for a total maximum of 8 consecutive years.
It also contained a bill of rights borrowed largely from the United States
Federal Constitution.’ (TT 10 September 1992:11-12, emphasis added)

The didactic advantages of such a comparative approach are clear,
112

Toward a Self-Reflexive Law? Narrating Torture’s
Legality in Human Rights Litigation

and none of the cited statements are inaccurate. However, the experts
failed to mention that not only the separation of powers and the
bill of rights, but also the very possibility of declaring martial law
and suspending rights, were a legacy of U.S. colonialism. Indeed,
this possibility had been introduced into Philippine law by the U.S.
Congress in 1916, and the provision of the 1935 Constitution copied
the wording of the U.S. legislation. 2 Similarly, the possibility of
suspending the writ of habeas corpus was initially granted to the
American Governor General by the 1902 Philippine Bill, and had
been used by him in 1905.3 In the 1970s and 1980s the United States
had also contributed much to the Marcos regime’s parody of the rule
of law by insisting that the regime periodically provide appearances
of electoral democracy and legality. By offering a very partial picture
of the American legal legacy in the Philippines, the trial limited the
law’s self-reflexivity: law was understood to have a repressive potential
outside the United States.
Indeed, the possibility that the American counterparts could also
degenerate into repression was implicitly denied. Expert witness Posner
stated in his testimony on the subservience of the judiciary to Marcos:
‘It may be difficult for U.S. citizens to comprehend how a strong and
independent civilian court system was seriously undermined by a series
of martial law decrees issued by Mr. Marcos himself.’(TT 15 September
1992: 24). Similarly, when witness Ramon Mappala, a former member
of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps in the Philippines, testified
about his arrest after he had given a lecture ‘about the Marcos regime
tendency towards going towards martial law’, Swift asked him whether
the lecture was critical of the Marcos regime. He answered: ‘I was
highly critical, yes, sir. I’m very much familiar with democratic process
of the United States.’ (TT 17 September 1992: 87).

While this limitation of law’s dark side to non-Western or nonUS law can be traced to ethnocentrism, strategic factors were also
likely at work. For Swift, avoiding discussions of U.S. support of the
regime was necessary in order to win the case.4 This limit to law’s
self-reflexivity might be seen as peculiar to legal processes with juries.
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However, courts and prosecutors engaged in proceedings concerning
mass atrocity generally face heightened legitimacy concerns, leading
them to produce ‘tortured history’ (Douglas 2001: 113). Indeed, the
next section shows how legitimacy concerns among appellate courts
in Marcos ultimately obscured the legality of repression.
3. Self-Reflexity in the Courts
In their descriptions of the facts of the case, the courts reproduced the
plaintiffs’ narrative of the Marcos regime as grounded in a constitutional
arrangement (e.g. 910 F. Supp., 1462). Moreover, they occasionally
discussed the human rights violations as having been state-sponsored,
as required by doctrinal considerations, such as the definition of torture
under international law. Yet in their discussions of legal doctrine, the
courts generally portrayed the violations in a manner that is difficult
to reconcile with an understanding of law as a facilitator of violence.
Even when the District Court discussed the element in the definition of
torture that connects it to the law (the requirement the court had crafted
that torture be done ‘under color of law’), it explained that element as an
abuse or imitation of law. The court instructed the jury thus:
‘Torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary detention
committed by a person under color of law violates international law,
United States law and Philippine law and renders that person liable
to the victim. The phrase ‘under color of law’ means that the person
allegedly responsible, here Ferdinand Marcos, used his government
position as President of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief
of the military, paramilitary and intelligence forces to act beyond the
bounds of his lawful authority. In order for Marco’s (sic) alleged unlawful
acts to have been done ‘under color of law,’ the unlawful acts must
have been done while Marcos was purporting or pretending to act in the
performance of his official duties. That is to say, the unlawful acts must
consist of an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by Marcos
only because he was a government official. Color of law as used in
these instructions means action purported to be taken by an official of a
government under any law of that country.’ (Final Jury Instructions:
9, emphases added).

114

Toward a Self-Reflexive Law? Narrating Torture’s
Legality in Human Rights Litigation

One possible explanation for this construction of torture as an
abuse of law is that it is easier to show a violation of a legal norm if the
violation itself is portrayed as non-law. In the context of transnational
human rights litigation, this portrayal is as much a question of being
legally ‘correct’ – ie proving a violation – as it is a question of legitimacy,
for a foreign court will have more difficulty justifying its intervention
if it is judging an act that was legal in the country in which it was
committed. Another explanation relates to the law’s uneasy blending
of descriptive and normative functions. The court can be taken here to
be explaining that torture, summary execution and disappearance are
abuses of the law as it should be, in the process obscuring that these
abuses relied on the law as it is.
In addition, specific doctrines in U.S. law, as in many jurisdictions,
preclude domestic courts from adjudicating the acts of foreign states.
The lawsuits had originally been dismissed under the act of state
doctrine, a doctrine that prevents courts from judging the public acts
of another sovereign state committed within that sovereign’s territory
(Trajano v. Marcos). Moreover, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA), foreign governments are immune from suit in
the U.S. except for categories of claims that reflect liability arising out
of private law transactions. Though the plain language of the FSIA
suggests that it is not applicable to individual defendants, and that
is indeed how it was interpreted in 2011 by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Samantar v. Yousuf 2010), this was not clear at the time of Marcos. In
fact, in an earlier case also involving the Philippines, the Ninth Circuit
itself had held that the FSIA could be invoked by individual defendants
(Chuidian v Philippine National Bank), and Marcos’ estate argued that
Marcos’ acts were immunised under the FSIA (Hilao v. Marcos 1994).
In Marcos, the courts rejected the applicability of these doctrines by
presenting the human rights abuses as personal wrongdoing abusive of
the constitutional and legal framework rather than repression enabled
by that framework.
When in 1989, the Ninth Circuit determined that the act of state
doctrine was not applicable to Marcos because he was a former dictator,
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it referred to its 1988 decision in Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos in
which it had insisted that ‘Marcos is a private citizen residing in the
United States.’ (Trajano v. Marcos). The Ninth Circuit applied the same
reasoning in a 1994 appeal by Marcos’ estate from a District Court
decision enjoining the estate from dissipating assets pending litigation:
‘the Estate argues that Marcos’ acts were premised on his official
authority, and thus fall within FSIA. However… Marcos’ actions
should be treated as taken without official mandate pursuant to his
own authority.’ (Hilao v. Marcos 1994, 1470-1).

The Court also cited its own decision in Republic of the Philippines
v. Marcos, referring to the comparison to rape, a crime with intensely
personal connotations:
‘Although sometimes criticized as a ruler and at times invested with
extraordinary powers, Ferdinand Marcos does not appear to have had
the authority of an absolute autocrat. He was not the state, but the
head of the state, bound by the laws that applied to him. Our courts
have had no difficulty in distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed
ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in law…. the
latter acts are as adjudicable and redressable as would be a dictator’s
act of rape.’ (id 1471).

Commentators have criticised the Ninth Circuit for failing to
develop a principled approach to the act of state doctrine and sovereign
immunity. With respect to both, the court distinguished Marcos on the
facts –the supposedly personal nature of the defendant’s acts – instead
of carving out a human rights exception to the doctrines (Fitzpatrick
1993: 511), as the English House of Lords would later do in Pinochet,
where it held that torture could not be considered a state function for
the purposes of functional immunity (R. v. Commissioner of Police for
the Metropolis and Others). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in 2012 followed in Pinochet’s footsteps, when it recognised
that torture could be ‘performed in the course of the foreign official’s
employment by the Sovereign’ yet not count as an official act for
purposes of immunity (Samantar v. Yousuf 2012). However, such
a principled approach might have been too much to ask in Marcos,
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where the U.S. courts’ legitimacy in exercising an extraordinary form
of jurisdiction was more questionable than in Pinochet,5 and the courts
were exposed to the charge of intruding on U.S. foreign policy.6 Marcos
was thus held liable, but this liability was portrayed as more personal
than institutional.
Conclusion
How can we use the Marcos case to begin thinking about developing
law’s self-reflexivity?

While trial proceedings offered opportunities for rich, detailed
discussions of constitutional structure, legal formalism and victims’
experiences of law, the more abstract discussions of higher courts erased
and obscured the legality of violence. Yet it is precisely these higher
court decisions that are diffused throughout the legal community,
concealing the insights gleaned during the lower court proceedings.
This essay has attempted to recover those insights, in the belief that
exposing and understanding law’s ‘dark side’ should become central to
the project of fighting mass atrocity. Such a project should, however,
abandon the assumption implicit in Marcos that law in the U.S. and
by extension other Western democracies cannot be used to such
repressive ends. Recovery and critical analysis of trial proceedings
is one step; using these proceedings along with historical writing as
teaching materials in law schools might also hold some promise. These
steps would mainstream what has until now been considered a ‘minor’
source of law.

Having recovered trial proceedings, analyses of the type conducted
here can also help elicit axes of inquiry for the design of self-reflexive
legal responses to mass atrocity, effecting a shift from a minor to a
major form of jurisprudence. The detailed and contextualized nature
of the present analysis, in which the historical narratives produced
in Marcos are understood against the background of later doctrinal
developments, enabled me to make such a shift without falling into
the trap of overbroad generalizations. The following illustrates the sort
of shift I have in mind:
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A first axis of inquiry might concern the type of defendant, from
head of state to low-level perpetrator. In Marcos, the fact that the
litigation took the form of a class action against a former head of state
significantly contributed to the representation of law as violent. The
need to prove a pattern of violations that could reach all members of
the class led the plaintiffs to offer numerous testimonies of experts,
witnesses and victims themselves as well as legal documents as evidence,
leading to discussions of law as enabling violence. While this points
to the class action as a valuable mechanism through which to address
mass atrocity, other legal mechanisms targeting high-level perpetrators
might have similar effects: when the definition of an international
crime or international human right, or theory of responsibility requires
understanding the broader context, proving a policy, or considering the
abuse’s effects on a large number of victims, law and legal documents
might serve to explain techniques of concentration of power, or of
legitimation of violence, or to ‘connect the dots’ between the defendant
and various actors involved in mass atrocity.
A second axis concerns the applicable legal norms, from various
forms of international law to domestic law. The Marcos case shows that
international human rights law’s traditional focus on state-sponsored
violence carries the possibility of addressing law’s contribution to
violence because of requirements of officialness in the definition of
torture. The courts’ construction of the litigated violence as personal
rather than institutionalised reflects to a certain extent the limitations
of early case-law on the issue of torture and immunity, case-law which
has since evolved.

Jurisdiction might constitute a third axis. We saw that the
distortions in the plaintiffs’ and courts’ narratives about the Marcos
regime derived in part from attempts to avoid alienating the jury and
appearing to interfere in a foreign country’s government, respectively.
The fact that legitimacy concerns affect the ability to produce rich
narratives about mass violence suggests that domestic courts exercising
universal jurisdiction as well as international tribunals, if they lack
strong legitimacy, might have limited abilities to expose the legality
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of violence, as opposed to domestic courts judging their country’s prior
regime. This would seem especially true if the foreign domestic court
is, like the United States in Marcos, implicated in the establishment
of the colonial legal order from which the litigated violence emerged.
My interpretation of the District Court’s construction of torture
as an abuse of law seems to point to inherent limitations of the legal
process for facing the legality of violence: the tendency to present
violations of legal norms as non-law, and to blend descriptive and
normative functions of judgment. This might point to a fourth axis,
concerning the degree of legalism of the institution, from criminal
trials where guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, to quasilegal mechanisms such as truth commissions where public testimony
and confession take centre stage, without requiring a determination
that norms have been violated. Truth commissions’ relaxation of legal
requirements certainly have advantages for the production of rich,
structural narratives about violence (though as argued by Leebaw 2011,
in practice they been conducted under legalist approaches). I would
argue nevertheless that giving up on the possibility of self-reflexivity
within legal processes would be overly deterministic. International legal
scholars have begun developing theories of adjudication that explicitly
seek to distinguish between descriptive and aspirational functions of
judgment (Mohamed 2014). Marcos might be taken to suggest that
as a strategic matter, we should pursue these projects in established
institutions enjoying strongest legitimacy, as the case shows how courts
exercising controversial forms of jurisdiction insist on their authority
by drawing sharp distinctions between their own legality and that of
the defendant.

The Marcos case exposes the close imbrication of brutal violence, law
and settler colonialism, and the difficulties of undoing such violence
within the postcolonial framework of international law. Yet rather than
condemning us to despair, this detailed historical analysis revealed
the web of contingent doctrinal limitations, litigation strategies,
political constraints and cultural assumptions that shaped the historical
narratives in this case, suggesting paths for reconstruction. It is in this
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sense that, to me, minor jurisprudence offers a mode of legal theorizing
beyond critique.
Endnotes
*

Lecturer (Assistant Professor), Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv
University. I thank Saira Mohamed, the workshop participants, and the
reviewers for very helpful comments.

1. In using the expression ‘dark side’ I draw on Kennedy 2005.

2. P.L. 240 (Organic Act for the Philippine Islands) granted the right to
declare martial law to the Governor-General of the Philippines. Muego
1988: 29.
3. The only other suspension of the writ occurred in 1950 when President
Quirino had used it to cope with a peasant insurgency. Id 31.
4. Telephone interview, 4 December 2014.

5. The Pinochet case did not raise as many questions about the court’s
legitimacy since it was based on an interpretation of the Convention
against Torture, which explicitly provided universal jurisdiction, and
in 1988 the United Kingdom had changed its criminal code to grant its
courts universal jurisdiction.
6. The Reagan administration began urging courts to decline jurisdiction of
human rights ATS claims in 1984. Stephens 2014: 1486.
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